Fetal therapy for Down syndrome:an ethical exploration by de Wert, Guido et al.
 
 
 
Fetal therapy for Down syndrome
Citation for published version (APA):
de Wert, G., Dondorp, W., & Bianchi, D. W. (2017). Fetal therapy for Down syndrome: an ethical
exploration. Prenatal Diagnosis, 37(3), 222-228. https://doi.org/10.1002/pd.4995
Document status and date:
Published: 01/03/2017
DOI:
10.1002/pd.4995
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 08 Jan. 2021
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Fetal therapy for Down syndrome: an ethical exploration
Guido de Wert1, Wybo Dondorp1* and Diana W. Bianchi2
1Department of Health, Ethics & Society, School for Oncology and Developmental Biology (GROW), School for Public Health and Primary Care (CAPHRI),
Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
2Mother Infant Research Institute, Tufts Medical Center and Tufts University School of Medicine, Boston, MA, US
*Correspondence to: Wybo Dondorp. E-mail: w.dondorp@maastrichtuniversity.nl
ABSTRACT
Background Parallel to recent advances in prenatal screening for Down syndrome (DS), therapies for different aspects
of the condition have become available. As intellectual disability is a key aspect, this is an active area for research.
Several groups have hypothesized that prenatal interventions will give better chances at improving cognitive
functioning in persons with DS than postnatal treatment. Clinical trials are being developed.
Method We first discuss the ethical pros and cons of trying to improve cognitive functioning in persons with DS to see
if there are categorical objections to the general idea, and then move on to explore ethically relevant aspects of the
prospect of developing fetal therapy for DS (FTDS).
Results Only on the basis of a one-dimensional emphasis on the social model of disability would (fetal) therapy aimed
at cognitive improvement be inherently problematic.
Conclusions Inviting pregnant women to participate in FTDS-research should be based on adequate pre-clinical trials,
as well as information aimed at avoiding the so-called ‘therapeutic misconception’. Should FTDS be proven to be
effective and safe, women carrying a fetus with trisomy 21 who have decided to continue the pregnancy may have
a moral obligation to make use of this option. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Funding sources: None declared
Conflicts of interest: Dr. Bianchi’s contribution to this work was conducted while she was employed at Tufts Medical Center. It does not necessarily reflect the views of
the United States Government or the National Institutes of Health.
INTRODUCTION
In many countries worldwide, prenatal screening for Down
syndrome (DS) has been available for decades. The recent
introduction of maternal plasma cell-free DNA sequencing
for DS, also known as ‘non-invasive prenatal testing’ (NIPT),
is widely appreciated as a major advance, as it detects around
97% of cases of trisomy 21 with a very low false positive rate
as early as 10weeks of gestation.1,2 Importantly, with NIPT
the positive predictive value (PPV) of a positive screen for
trisomy 21 is 10- to 20-fold higher than current techniques of
biochemical analyte and nuchal translucency
measurements.3,4
In parallel, over the last few decades, medical and surgical
therapies for different aspects of DS have become available,
and there is wide interest in their further development and
improvement. While therapies for DS are starting to become
integrated into postnatal care, there is a growing interest in
the development of fetal (prenatal, in utero) therapy (FTDS),
as part of a ‘fetal personalized medicine’ strategy.5 This
approach may be more effective than waiting until after birth,
particularly when it comes to neurocognitive FTDS aimed at
improving the future child’s intellectual development and
independent life skills.6 It is hoped and expected that such
therapy, if effective, could become an option for pregnant
women carrying a fetus with trisomy 21, and presented as part
of post-test counseling.
While research on neurocognitive FTDS is still mainly in the
pre-clinical stage, a pro-active ethical debate is needed, as such
research, and the possible future integration of FTDS into
clinical care, raises complex normative questions, both
substantive and procedural. The main question of this article
is as follows: is neurocognitive FTDS ethically justified or even
desirable, and if so, under what conditions?
CURRENT AND FUTURE TREATMENTS FOR DOWN
SYNDROME
Until a few decades ago, DS was considered an untreatable
condition. Many babies with DS died because of severe
congenital heart or intestinal anomalies, and those who
survived were often institutionalized. This picture has changed
remarkably, as in most countries; it is now typical for affected
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children to be raised by their families and to attend public
schools.7
Postnatal treatments for Down syndrome
Current standards of care
At the present time, all therapies only address the symptoms of
DS; they do not remove the extra copy of chromosome 21. In
the United States and other developed countries, there are
clear guidelines to aid pediatricians who provide primary care
for infants and children with DS.8 These include confirmation
of prenatal genetic diagnostic tests, annual audiology and
ophthalmology examinations, annual hemoglobin and thyroid
stimulation hormone (TSH) screening, echocardiography
studies and a cardiology consultation, and a sleep study by
the age of 4 years due to the increased incidence of sleep
apnea.9 It is expected that any abnormalities detected during
these examinations will be treated as they would for any child
without DS. For example, 50% of infants with DS have
congenital heart disease and 12% have gastrointestinal
atresias.8 These are treated with surgical repair. Fifty per cent
of children with DS have refractive errors, and they are treated
with corrective lenses.
Clinical research
Abnormalities in virtually every organ system, except the brain,
are routinely treated in DS. Intellectual disability, however, is a
key aspect of the condition. While not every person with DS (or
parent of a child with DS) wishes to pursue neurocognitive
treatment, this is certainly an active area of clinical research.
In general, the goal is to raise a person’s intellectual quotient
(IQ) to facilitate improvement in independent living skills. To
date, nine different molecules have been tested in adult and
adolescent clinical trials (as reviewed in Guedj et al. 201410).
These include the acetyl cholinesterase inhibitors donepezil
and rivastigmine, the choline pathway enhancer piracetam, a
glutamate receptor (NMDAR) antagonist, memantine, human
growth hormone, folinic acid, vitamin E, the DYRK1A inhibitor
epigallocatechine gallate (EGCG), and a gamma butyric acid
receptor antagonist known as RG1662. While two of these
molecules (EGCG and piracetam) have demonstrated limited
clinical benefits, the majority has not shown statistically
significant improvement in treated individuals. This is in part,
possibly because the treatments are being administered too
late in life.
Future approaches
As stated earlier, there is no ‘comprehensive’ therapy for DS,
meaning that all of the signs and symptoms of the condition
will be eliminated. It is uncertain that there will ever be one.
Yet, a relatively recent basic science study explored the
possibility that the extra copy of chromosome 21 could be
‘silenced’ in an in vitro model system.11 By inactivating the
third copy of chromosome 21, Jiang and colleagues
demonstrated that they could get normal development to
proceed. This study received much attention in the scientific
and lay press, with The Guardian commenting, ‘Although full
treatment is still many years off, the work will drive the
research for therapies that improve common symptoms of
DS.’12 However, while this approach is feasible in cell culture,
there will be major difficulties in translating this to developing
human embryos.
Fetal therapy for Down syndrome
Until recently, little attention has been paid to the brain
phenotype in fetuses with DS. Deviation from typical fetal
development starts to occur by the second trimester, as
demonstrated by sonographic examinations,13,14 magnetic
resonance examinations,15 and studies of brain-derived cell-
free RNA in amniotic fluid supernatant.16 Several groups have
hypothesized that prenatal will be more effective than
postnatal neurocognitive treatment because neuronal
progenitor cells die in utero in fetuses with DS; if this can be
reversed it will lead to more typical brain growth and
intercellular wiring.6,17 If safe and effective, FTDS may
revolutionize the concept and practice of prenatal screening
for DS. In this scenario, NIPT would create a ‘window of
opportunity’ for FTDS.5,17
Standard of care
Following a prenatal diagnosis of trisomy 21, the standard of
care is for the expectant couple to undergo post-test
counseling, ideally by someone with knowledge of
contemporary outcomes for children with DS. In one study
that compared outcomes between 21 women who had
prenatal diagnosis and continued the pregnancy versus 17
women who received their child’s diagnosis at birth,18 multiple
benefits of prenatal diagnosis were shown. These included the
chance to prepare educationally and psychologically for the
birth of their child, meeting the pediatric subspecialists who
would care for their child once born, and the opportunity to
deliver at a tertiary medical center where they would not be
separated from their infant.
Clinical research
Based on data from studies in DS mouse models suggesting
improved brain growth following prenatal or neonatal
exposure to the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor anti-
depressant fluoxetine (Prozac),19,20 a team at the University
of Texas Southwestern Medical Center is enrolling 21 pregnant
women whose fetuses have been diagnosed with trisomy 21
into a clinical study comparing maternal administration of
fluoxetine (N = 14) to a placebo control (N = 7).21 After birth,
the infants will continue treatment or placebo up until 2 years
of age. Study participants will undergo regular behavioral
testing and magnetic resonance imaging to measure brain size
and evaluate anatomical landmarks.
Future approaches
Although there is some controversy regarding which mouse
models best represent the clinical phenotype in humans with
DS, an extensive integrated analysis of human and murine
dysregulated transcriptomes and pathways is currently
underway.22 Data have been acquired from amniocytes from
living human fetuses with trisomy 21, and age and sex-
matched euploid controls, as well as embryonic day 15.5
forebrains from three different mouse models of DS (Ts1Cje,
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Ts65Dn, and Dp16). Gene expression data have been uploaded
into the Connectivity Map (www.broadinstitute.org/CMap)
database to identify safe drugs that are approved by the
United States Food and Drug Administration and would be
expected to reverse the abnormal embryonic brain phenotype.
The CMap analyses have identified 56 candidate molecules
with high predictive scores to rescue abnormal gene
expression in both mice and humans.22 Additional preclinical
studies include administration of EGCG and/or choline
supplementation to pregnant dams carrying embryos with
model forms of DS. While murine and human brains develop
differently, these preclinical studies are important to
demonstrate safety and efficacy of various therapies. It is
anticipated that human clinical trials will begin within the next
5 years, although it should be noted that pregnant women
carrying fetuses with DS are already taking supplements and
medications outside of the traditional medical mainstream.
ETHICS OF (FETAL) NEUROCOGNITIVE THERAPY FOR
DOWN SYNDROME
In this section, we will first argue that the development of
neurocognitive therapy for DS is ethically desirable. Secondly,
we will defend the ethical acceptability of moving this therapy
to the prenatal period. As this will be a discussion on general
pros and cons, nothing will be written about the conditions
for the responsible development and introduction of this new
form of fetal therapy. We will address that further question in
the next section.
Ethics of therapy for Down syndrome
In a survey among parents of children with DS, Canadian
researchers explored how they would perceive the possible
availability of (postnatal) treatment that would mitigate the
intellectual disability associated with DS.23 They found that
parental attitudes toward such a scenario were complex and
affected by different and sometimes conflicting ethical
considerations. Most respondents supported the statement
that reducing intellectual disability in individuals affected with
DS would be a good thing. However, only a smaller proportion
would want to use this for their own child. Arguments in
support of neurocognitive treatment focused on enhanced
independence and improved quality of life both for the child
and the family.
Ethically, these arguments can be accounted for in terms of
beneficence, autonomy, and justice. Beneficence is served
because raising their IQ will enable people with DS to have
more control over their own lives, thus also taking away what
they may experience as a source of frustration.24 The ability
to reason may either be regarded as a ‘general purpose means’
necessary for all possible life plans25 or as an essential part of
human flourishing.26 On the latter perspective, promoting a
person’s autonomy is a morally worthwhile aim in itself.
Moreover, the parents also considerably benefit from being
freed from the responsibilities related to their child’s life-long
dependence and concerns about who will take care of the child
when they are no longer around.27 Finally, the removal of
barriers to equal opportunities due to a disorder or handicap
can be regarded as a requirement of justice.28 The reasoning
being that if justice requires compensating inequalities of
opportunity that result from disabilities, it also provides a
ground for efforts aimed at taking away the cause of those
inequalities.
In addition to potentially benefitting children with DS and
their parents, the availability of effective neurocognitive
treatment may have the further benefit of giving more options
for reproductive choice to pregnant women (and their
partners), when found to be carrying a fetus with trisomy 21.
Especially for those in whom the choice between having a child
with an intellectual disability and terminating the pregnancy is
a real dilemma, it might make an important difference to know
that with early treatment the cognitive functioning of their
child can be significantly improved.
The idea of developing neurocognitive treatment for DS also
raises ethical concerns among parents of children with DS.23
Part of these relate to what has been called the social model
of disability. While the traditional medical model understands
handicap or impairment in both medico-biological and
individual terms, the social model focuses on socio-cultural
structures that are behind the barriers to equal participation
of people with impairments.29,30 This perspective suggests that
if anything is in need of change, it is not people with DS, but
society’s failure to properly support them. The social-model
perspective is behind the so-called ‘expressivist’ critique of
prenatal testing for DS and other congenital abnormalities.31
The offer of such testing would send the message that the lives
of people with disabilities are burdens to society that can best
be avoided through timely diagnosis and selective abortion.
Building on this, some might argue that the provision of
neurocognitive treatment would send a similar message of
not accepting people with DS as they are. A related argument
is that people with DS contribute to diversity, and that this is
to be regarded as something valuable for society as a whole.
Moreover, some parents of children with DS see their
disability as an occasion for their own moral growth.24 Finally,
treatment would not just change some disease-related
features, but it would affect the individual’s personality. This
leads to the question as to what extent such treatment could
be regarded a benefit to that person?
Reflecting on these considerations, we do not think that
ethically, it would be wrong to try to develop neurocognitive
treatment for DS. It is certainly true that at least part of the
problems that people with disabilities such as DS encounter
could be avoided or diminished if society were more inclusive
of diversity. To the extent that this social dimension is
neglected in the medical model of disability, it is indeed one-
sided. But the same goes for the social model, in so far as it
reduces the problems of people with DS to prejudice and
exclusion. The two models should be regarded as
complementary rather than mutually exclusive.29 Ignoring this,
the ‘expressivist’ critique fails to acknowledge that pregnant
women and their partners may have morally sound reasons
for wanting to avoid the birth of a child with DS and that
enabling this choice through prenatal testing does not in itself
presuppose a negative view of the value of the life of people
with DS. Nor is such a view necessarily implied in the idea of
neurocognitive treatment. Moreover, as there are plenty of
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other opportunities that give cause for celebrating societal
diversity and for pursuing moral growth as individuals and
parents, these ideals should not be regarded as standing in
the way of trying to improve the quality of life of people with
DS by means of medical interventions. To the extent that the
‘change of personality’ argument is indeed more convincing,
it is only so with regard to neurocognitive treatment of
individuals whose personalities have already been formed. In
fact, several respondents in the Canadian study said they might
have considered treatment for DS ‘at or before birth’ when
their child’s personality was still to be formed, but not later
in his or her life.23
Ethics of fetal therapy for Down syndrome
As there are strong ethical reasons for developing
neurocognitive treatment for DS and as there do not seem to
be overriding objections, the question arises what this would
mean for the development of FTDS? As explained above, an
important reason for making the step to the prenatal period
is its hypothesized greater effectiveness. If, by treating DS
prenatally, a greater increase in IQ can be obtained than with
postnatal therapies, then in principle, this would be an
argument for preferring FTDS. Secondly, in addition to
avoiding the ‘change of personality’ objection by treating
before birth, FTDS may have a psychological advantage over
postnatal treatment for the parents, as the child will already
be born with better neurocognitive capacities. Third, if FTDS
is indeed more effective than postnatal treatment, this
approach might create an additional option for pregnant
women and their partners. However, the ethics of this last
point can be analyzed in different ways that need to be
carefully distinguished.
From a ‘fetalist’ perspective, the development of FTDS may
be welcomed as making abortion of fetuses with trisomy 21
unnecessary. In fact, this is in line with how the aim of prenatal
diagnosis was understood by Jérôme Lejeune, the French
pediatrician and geneticist credited with the discovery of the
chromosomal basis of Down syndrome.32 Others have also
stated that the development of safe and effective fetal therapy
belongs to the ‘ultimate goals’ of prenatal diagnosis.33 As such,
this seems an ideal that no one could reasonably criticize.
However, to the extent that it hinges on an understanding that
fetuses are patients who have a right to be treated, it may
connect to a ‘pro-life’ agenda that denies women the right to
abortion. Whereas it should be welcomed that FTDS gives
women a further choice, presenting this as the morally
preferred option would be ethically problematic, given the
contested nature of the underlying view of the status of the
fetus.
From a liberal (‘pro-choice’) perspective, the development of
this alternative is to be welcomed as in line with the very aim of
prenatal testing, understood as serving reproductive autonomy
by giving individual women or couples meaningful options for
choice with regard to reproductive risks.34,35 However, it
should be acknowledged that for some women or couples,
abortion is unacceptable or even illegal. Even for many of
those couples who are not categorically opposed to
termination, deciding to end a wanted pregnancy remains an
extremely difficult choice that may have lifelong psychosocial
consequences. And for those pregnant women who at present
reject the offer of prenatal screening for DS because they
would not consider a selective termination of a trisomy 21
pregnancy,36 this may change with the availability of FTDS as
an option. If proven effective and safe, FTDS would have the
further benefit of allowing the practice of prenatal screening
to better achieve its aim of facilitating autonomous
reproductive choices.
The reasoning that FTDS would create an alternative option
for reproductive choice that should neither be imposed upon
women nor withheld from them, seems to closely connect with
the ethos of professional non-directivity and respect for
reproductive autonomy. However, as we will argue in the next
section, this is only part of the story. Because if pregnant
women carrying a fetus with trisomy 21 decide not to have an
abortion but to carry the pregnancy to term, the availability
of the new option of FTDS cannot be regarded as morally
indifferent. As we will argue, the decision not to have an
abortion creates a prima facie moral obligation to make use
of FTDS, if indeed proven effective, beneficial and safe. Clearly,
this is not without consequences for the ethics of reproductive
counseling.
RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTRODUCTION OF
FETAL THERAPY FOR DOWN SYNDROME
All treatments aimed at the fetus, whether surgical or medical,
also entail an intervention into the body of the pregnant
woman. This means that fetal therapy, just like any other
medical treatment proposed to the pregnant woman, requires
her explicit consent. This is not to say that the role of fathers-
to-be is not important, or that professionals should exclude
them from the decision-making process.37 In fact, most
couples will want to make these decisions together, as they
affect the future of both their child and their family. The point,
however, is that fetal therapy involves the pregnant woman
directly, as she will have medical or surgical interventions that
make her a patient or research subject as well. That is
something about which, both ethically and legally, only she
can decide.
But consent is not enough to render the proposition
ethical.38 Some have argued that fetal therapy should only be
considered if the risk to the health and well-being of the
pregnant woman is negligible.39 In our view, this is too strong.
Given the interests at stake, particularly the woman’s self-
declared interest in giving birth to a healthy child as well as
the health interests of the child-to-be, more than negligible
risks may well be acceptable, as long as they are not
disproportionate.40
Ethics of research into fetal therapy for Down syndrome
Whereas the term ‘therapy’ may suggest established
treatments, in fact many prenatal interventions are still
experimental or investigational. In view of the need for
adequate pre-clinical data from animal models demonstrating
safety and efficacy, there is a concern that human trials for
FTDS may have been started prematurely. Criteria originally
developed for fetal surgery, but generally relevant, stipulate
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that fetal interventions should only be carried out in
specialized multidisciplinary fetal treatment centers following
strict protocols that have been approved by a local ethics
committee. They should only be considered if (1) the diagnosis
is certain, (2) the natural history of the disorder is clearly
understood, (3) there is no equally effective postnatal therapy,
(4) there is compelling experimental evidence regarding safety
and efficacy based on animal studies.41 There is currently
much support in the field for introducing new fetal treatments
in a clinical research setting, ideally using randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) and evaluating long term effects in
the children and their mothers.
As a general rule, because of the balance of risks and
benefits, fetal therapy should only be considered if the disorder
to be treated has been definitively diagnosed. For FTDS
research studies this means that only pregnant women
carrying a fetus with trisomy 21 based on a diagnostic test such
as amniocentesis or CVS should be included. Inclusion should
be limited to women (couples) who have already clearly
decided that they want to keep the child.
Invitingwomen toparticipate in FTDS research should be based
on adequate information aimed at avoiding the so-called
‘therapeuticmisconception,’by stressing that the research is being
performed precisely because it is not yet known whether FTDS
leads to better outcomes than doing nothing. What should also
be made clear is that FTDS may lead to a better neurocognitive
outcome in children with DS and should not be expected to
provide a complete cure for the syndrome as a whole.
Follow-up: impact of fetal therapy for Down syndrome
Whether FTDS is successful ultimately depends not on the
level of cognitive improvement, but on the extent to which it
improves the lives of people with DS. This links with current
research on self-esteem and social comparison in people with
cognitive impairments.42 As negative social comparisons are
found to be related to depression and psychopathology, FTDS
can be expected to have a positive impact on the quality of life
of people with DS. However, there are also hypothetical
concerns about adverse effects. For instance, it can be asked if
a partial improvement in cognitive functioning may make
persons with DS only more aware of not being able to fully
participate in society or to realize the professional and
reproductive options that are open to others. They may also
bemore aware of the threat of developing early onset dementia,
something that FTDS may or may not be able to avert. In this
connection, an important issue is how any of these positive or
negative effects aremediated by parental disclosure to the child
of having had FTDS. Finally: to the extent that FTDS would
bring the IQ of some people with DS into the typical range, they
would still be physically recognizable as having DS. How would
this affect their social functioning and acceptance?23
Timing of fetal therapy for Down syndrome
Should FTDS become available as a possible option for women
carrying a fetus with trisomy 21, an important issue concerns
the best timing for the intervention. From a
neurodevelopmental perspective, it may well be best to start
treatment as early as possible (i.e., in the first trimester).6 This
would then increase pressure for early diagnosis and early
decision-making as to whether to continue the pregnancy or
have a termination. With CVS, a diagnosis of trisomy 21 can
be obtained at 11weeks. However, there are some concerns
with pushing for early decision making. Firstly, at this stage
of pregnancy there is a relatively high spontaneous fetal loss
rate in trisomy 21. This not only means a relatively high rate
of psychologically burdensome termination decisions for
pregnancies that would otherwise not have led to a surviving
infant, but also that women who decide to have FTDS at an
early stage of pregnancy may turn out to have undergone that
treatment ‘for nothing’. Of course, how problematic that is
would also depend on the eventual safety-profile of FTDS.
Secondly, the push for an early choice may be at odds with
the ideal of helping pregnant women to make well considered
autonomous decisions about what to do with the pregnancy.
Finally, additional information about related comorbidities
(e.g., heart defects) that women or couples might regard as
relevant for their decision-making may only become available
later in pregnancy. Psychological research into how the
availability and the timing of FTDS may affect the dynamics
of reproductive decision-making will be needed to find out
how best to answer these concerns.
Fetal therapy for Down syndrome: reproductive autonomy and
parental responsibility
Given that the status of the fetus is a matter of irreconcilable
world views, pregnant women should not be expected to
expose themselves to possible risks in order the save the life
of the fetus, not even after the potential for extra uterine
viability has been achieved.40 In so far, as we have argued
above, there is no reason for moving away from the ethos of
reproductive autonomy. However, several fetal therapies
already incorporated into clinical care, such as the surgical
correction of myelomeningocoele in utero,43 are not about
saving the fetus, but about improving the health prospects of
the future child. This would also be the case with FTDS. And
whatever the status of the fetus, it is clear that the child-to-
be, if it is allowed to be born, will indeed be or become a
person, whose interests can already be harmed or furthered
during pregnancy.44–46 Importantly, for the interests of the
future child to count, it is irrelevant at what gestational age
treatment would take place. Concerns that this would
undermine the woman’s right to have a termination are
mistaken. For if she has an abortion, there will be no child
whose interests can be harmed or promoted by her choices.
But if she decides to carry the pregnancy to term, the interests
of the future child should be a morally weighty consideration.
This may entail a certain degree of professional
directiveness, in cases in which the woman would need to be
reminded of her parental responsibility. This is not really
different from directively counseling pregnant women to stop
smoking or drinking alcohol. Of course, the moral scope for
asking the pregnant woman to consider fetal therapy is
constrained by the principle of proportionality. One should
only think here of an accepted, evidence-based treatment that
would save the future child from significant and irreversible
damage, without exposing the pregnant woman to serious
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burdens or risks.40 Depending on the outcome of clinical trials,
FTDS may well fit this profile.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There are strong ethical reasons for developing neurocognitive
prenatal treatment for DS. None of the possible concerns
amounts to an overriding a priori objection.
If, with FTDS, a greater increase in IQ can be obtained, then
in principle, this would be an argument for preferring FTDS
over postnatal therapies.
If safe and effective, FTDS will give pregnant women carrying a
fetuswith trisomy 21 an additional reproductive option that allows
them a ‘third path’ to avoid the dilemma between having a
termination or giving birth to a child with intellectual disabilities.
The aim of FTDS is not to protect the fetus against abortion,
but to further the reproductive interests of prospective parents
and the interests of their future child.
As a form of fetal therapy, FTDS entails an intervention into
the body of the body of the pregnant woman that requires her
informed consent. That can only be ethical on the basis of
scientific evidence that the treatment is more effective than
no treatment, and that the risks and burdens are not
disproportionate.
Inviting pregnant women to participate in FTDS-research
should be based on adequate pre-clinical trials, as well as
information aimed at avoiding the so-called ‘therapeutic
misconception’. To avoid decision-regret, inclusion should be
limited to thosewhohave already clearly decided that theywant
to continue the pregnancy. If pregnant women carrying a fetus
with trisomy 21 decide to continue the pregnancy, this may
create a prima facie moral obligation to make use of FTDS, if
indeed proven effective and safe. This also may require a
reconsideration of the ethics of reproductive counseling,
allowing for some degree of professional directivity with regard
to choices that are notmorally indifferent.
Outcomes research will be necessary to determine if
FTDS results in improvements in the quality of life for
people with DS. Lastly, If FTDS is safe and effective,
psychosocial research will also be needed to see how the
availability and the timing of this treatment may affect the
dynamics of reproductive decision-making by pregnant
women and their partners.
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WHAT’S ALREADY KNOWN ABOUT THIS TOPIC?
• An extensive integrated analysis of human and murine dysregulated
transcriptomes and pathways is currently underway. Candidate
molecules have been identified with high predictive scores to reverse
the abnormal embryonic brain phenotype in both mice and humans.
• Parents of children with DS were found to have complex and
diverging attitudes with regard to the desirability of treatment aimed
at improving cognitive functioning.
WHAT DOES THIS STUDY ADD?
• There are strong ethical reasons for developing neurocognitive
treatment for DS.
• The aim of fetal treatment for DS is not to protect the fetus against
abortion, but to further the reproductive interests of prospective
parents and the interests of their future child.
• If safe and effective, fetal treatment for DS will give a pregnant
woman carrying a fetus with trisomy 21 an additional reproductive
option.
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